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Scholars have speculated on the effects of social media on our self-esteem, but research 
has resulted in mixed findings (e.g., Valkenburg et al., 2006). One area that has yet to be 
investigated thoroughly is how social media use relates to self-esteem pursuit (Crocker & 
Park, 2004). Self-esteem pursuit has negative outcomes for learning, relatedness, and 
autonomy (Crocker & Park, 2004), but research has yet to determine whether pursuing 
self-esteem on social media results in similar negative outcomes. The current study 
investigated whether social media engage users in self-esteem pursuit by priming existing 
self-esteem contingencies. Additionally, we investigated whether these contingencies 
lead to preoccupation with the self or impact rational information processing. Using a 
selective exposure paradigm, we assessed whether heightened awareness of self-esteem 
contingencies on social media motivates one to bolster their self-view by engaging in 
biased motivational reasoning (i.e., confirmation bias) and whether the proposed 
relationship can be explained by an increase in self-focused attention. Results showed 
that engaging with Instagram (relative to Wikipedia) did not produce increases in 
contingent self-esteem or biased motivational reasoning behavior. These findings suggest 
that brief exposure to varied content on social media does not prime existing self-esteem 
contingencies. Implications of these results with respect to improving the current methods 
for future investigation of this research question are discussed. 





Your Mind Online: The Influence of Contingent Self-Esteem on Confirmation Bias 
While the proverbial jury is still out on how social media influence our 
psychological well-being, one thing can be said with certainty; peoples’ lives on social 
media are not always an accurate representation of real life. People often meticulously 
tailor their profiles to display a rosier and more ideal version of their lives (Rosenberg & 
Egbert, 2011) and omit negative or mundane information about themselves. As a result, 
users frequently report comparing themselves to others on social media as stressors in 
their lives (Fox & Moreland, 2015), but feel a social obligation to maintain use (Fox & 
Moreland, 2015) and even report that they believe that other users are happier and more 
successful than themselves (Chou & Edge, 2012). Certainly, these constant comparisons 
can leave people feeling like they are inferior to their peers (Lup et al., 2015; Vogel et al., 
2017; Alfasi, 2019), but could the constant pressure to live up to others’ most ideal 
moments have consequences beyond just our psychological well-being and self-esteem? 
More research is needed to explore how social media use relates to self-esteem, our 
unhealthy obsession with the unrealistic standards set by others, and the resultant 
downstream consequences social media have on our behavior. The current research 
focuses on how social media encourage self-esteem contingencies and how preoccupation 
with these domains of contingency can impact information processing. Specifically, this 
paper asserts that preoccupation with the self in the context of social media is a 
cognitively demanding endeavor that may contribute to heuristic processing of 
information, such as confirmation bias, in decision-making. 
Self-esteem has received some of the most thorough investigation of all 




inception of psychology as a scientific discipline. James (1890) initially posited that 
people strive to feel good about themselves and that maintaining a positive view of 
oneself is fundamental to human nature. As a result, much of the research has focused on 
self-esteem as a global affection for the self and has been theorized that self-esteem 
facilitates goals (Bednar et al., 1989), serves as a monitor of social dominance (Barkow, 
1980), as well as buffers fears of one’s own death (Solomon et al., 1991). However, each 
of the previously mentioned theoretical perspectives have been subjected to both 
empirical and conceptual criticism (Leary, 1999), resulting in a murkier understanding of 
the function of self-esteem to human behavior. Drawing on James’s (1890) observations 
about the role of self-esteem in a different light, Leary and Baumeister’s sociometer 
theory (2000) suggests that self-esteem serves as a monitor for social acceptance, allows 
an individual to interpret social cues to devaluation and acceptance, and prompts people 
to change their behavior accordingly. Despite mixed evidence for the behavioral 
imperatives of sociometer theory, the theory’s position that self-esteem functions as a 
gauge for social acceptance has been soundly demonstrated (Mahadevan et al., 2016).  
While this function of self-esteem would have undoubtedly been adaptive for our 
evolutionary predecessors, having a monitor for self-esteem may not always be ideal. For 
example, Crocker and Park’s (2004) theoretical perspective of self-esteem pursuit and 
contingent self-esteem offers insight into the darker side of self-esteem. They suggest that 
although trait self-esteem is an important element of psychological well-being, the way in 
which one pursues self-esteem and the domains from which they derive their self-esteem 
is equally, if not more, important. Particularly, people who primarily derive their self-




consequences such that the short-term benefits of pursuing self-esteem are often 
outweighed by long-term costs (Crocker & Park, 2004). Consequences of highly 
contingent self-esteem generally include threats to learning, autonomy, and self-
regulation and many of these effects are attributed to the biased motivational reasoning 
associated with pursuing self-esteem (Crocker & Park, 2004). Additionally, self-esteem 
that is highly contingent on external sources (e.g., physical appearance or the approval of 
others) is associated with further negative outcomes such as lower self-esteem (Kernis et 
al., 2008) and lower psychological well-being (Crocker et al., 2003; Park & Crocker, 
2008), among other problems (Schöne et al., 2015; Crocker, 2002). Although Crocker 
and Park (2004) provide numerous examples of the consequences of self-esteem pursuit, 
they do not offer a specific explanation for why self-esteem pursuit engenders these 
consequences. However, Crocker and Park’s (2004) descriptions of the consequences of 
self-esteem pursuit commonly hinge on an increase in negative, self-focused attention, 
also referred to as self-preoccupation in the literature (Sakamoto, 1998). Based on this 
observation, self-preoccupation may be a theoretically important psychological 
mechanism to explore in the context of self-esteem pursuit.  
Self-preoccupation is thought to be a contributing factor in the development of 
depression (Ingram, 1990), and is a key factor in social anxiety (Smith et al., 1983). It is 
characterized by cognitions of self-doubt, self-derogation, and, most importantly, 
anticipation of drops in self-esteem (Sarason, 1975) related to fear of being negatively 
evaluated by others (Kocovski & Endler, 2000). Furthermore, self-preoccupation has 
been found to interfere with performance on cognitive tasks such as the Stroop test 




negative self-appraisals, which interrupt task-oriented attention (Sarason, 1984). Though 
not universally, social media environments are rich with content that encourages these 
negative thoughts and beliefs about the self via social comparison (Lup et al., 2015; 
Vogel et al., 2017; Alfasi, 2019). And while research has not directly examined the 
relationship between contingent self-esteem and self-preoccupation, links between 
contingent self-esteem and fear of negative evaluation have been found (Biolcati, 2017). 
These findings demonstrate promise for the relationship between contingent self-esteem 
and self-preoccupation considering that fear of negative evaluation and self-
preoccupation can be coactivated (Junghans-Rutelonis et al., 2015; Junghan-Rutelonis et 
al., 2017) for people who are high in social anxiety (Kocovski & Endler, 2000), which 
many frequent social media users are (Dobrean & Pasarelu, 2016).  
Despite the applicability of self-preoccupation and contingent self-esteem to the 
realm of social media, much of the research on self-preoccupation (Sarason, 1975; Smith 
et al., 1983; Ingram, 1990) and contingent self-esteem (Crocker et al., 2003; Crocker & 
Park, 2004; Park & Crocker, 2008; Kernis et al., 2008) was published with the advent of 
social media still on the horizon. As a result, there is little to no commentary on how 
social media contribute to self-esteem pursuit and motivational goals. More recent 
research has demonstrated that social media users do engage in self-evaluation online 
(Chou & Edge, 2012; Fox & Moreland, 2015) and that self-esteem contingencies are 
influential in online settings (Stapleton et al., 2017). These findings raise an important 
question; given that social media constitute an environment with triggers to self-esteem 
pursuit and the limitations to the cognitive system that result from this endeavor (Crocker 




biases when interacting with social media than in other settings that do not trigger self-
esteem pursuit? If social media use does increase a person’s susceptibility to biased 
reasoning, then critical evaluation of information received on social media may be 
compromised by self-esteem pursuit. Moreover, in what ways are the limitations to the 
cognitive system a product of heightened awareness of and preoccupation with one’s 
self? 
One commonly used paradigm to study confirmation bias that is useful in 
answering these central questions is to present participants with additional information 
about a topic after they have already made a decision about that topic (Frey, 1986; Hart et 
al., 2009). The notion behind the selective exposure to information paradigm is that 
psychological inconsistency can be created by forcing participants to make a choice and 
then presenting them with both consistent and inconsistent information. Even arbitrary, 
preliminary decisions can influence the way that one looks at information; Aronson 
(1969) suggested that inconsistencies related to a decision that one has made engender a 
threat to self-competence and the resulting dissonance motivates one to seek congenial 
information—reaffirming the self as competent in the process. For instance, when 
presented with such an inconsistency, people often selectively attend to information that 
suggests the decision that they have made is correct and ignore information that argues 
otherwise (Frey, 1986). Jonas et al. (2006) had participants imagine that they had won a 
vacation, presented them with five destination options, and asked them to choose one of 
the trips and rank the remaining four trips. Participants were presented with summary 
statements that highlighted positive or negative aspects of their chosen trip and their 




they would like to read the whole statement as well as how relevant each piece of 
information was to their decision. Confirmation bias was then assessed by evaluating the 
difference in the mean number of pieces of consonant and dissonant information chosen 
by the participant. This example highlights the utility of the selective exposure paradigm 
in studying confirmation bias: Not only is it useful for instantiating psychological 
inconsistency, but it can easily be implemented in a factorial design to examine 
differences in confirmation bias between diverse experimental manipulations. Despite its 
utility in studying various threats to the self (Frey, 1986; Lavine et al., 2005), no research 
to our knowledge has used the paradigm to study confirmation bias in the context of self-
esteem contingencies or self-preoccupation. 
Rationale. The goal of the current study was to explore how contingent self-
esteem (as primed by social media use) influences peoples’ interest in and evaluation of 
information using a selective exposure paradigm. Additionally, the current study 
examined the extent to which the relationship between contingent self-esteem and 
confirmation bias is partially transmitted through the mechanism of self-preoccupation. 
Participants made a preliminary decision about a topic (“Should the voting age be 
lowered to 16?”) and were then randomly assigned to browse either their own Instagram 
account or Wikipedia/News (hereafter “Wikipedia”) articles on the same topic. After 
spending 10 minutes with either medium, participants read 16 fabricated summary 
statements from political scientists: half that argued for and half that argued against 
lowering the voting age. For each piece of information, participants chose whether they 
would like to read the full statement (if given the opportunity) and also rated how 




relevance, participants indicated whether or not they intended to stick with their 
preliminary decision. Confirmation bias was assessed by comparing participants’ 
preference for summary statements that either supported or opposed their decision and by 
examining participants’ stay/change decisions. More specifically, bias was defined as 
choosing to read more confirming than disconfirming statements. 
Hypothesis I. Overall, participants will prefer decision consistent information 
over decision inconsistent information. However, participants in the Instagram condition 
(compared to the Wikipedia condition) will have a greater preference for information that 
supports their decisions than for information that opposes their decision. 
Hypothesis II. Participants in the Instagram condition (compared to the 
Wikipedia condition) will rate information that supports their decision as more relevant 
than information that opposes their decision. 
Hypothesis III. Participants in the Instagram condition (compared to the 
Wikipedia condition) will have a greater tendency to stick with their initial decision. 
Hypothesis IV. Self-preoccupation is a partial mediator to the relationship 
between online content type and confirmation bias such that having highly contingent 
self-esteem (assumed to be activated in the Instagram condition) causes a person to have 
more preoccupation about the self which is cognitively demanding and leads people to 






 A pilot study was conducted to assess convergent, discriminant, and concurrent 
validity of contingent self-esteem, as well as to assess the ability of the 
Instagram/Wikipedia manipulation to influence contingent self-esteem scores. 
 
Participants 
Participants (N = 91, Mage = 19.64 years, SD = 1.49, see Table 1 for additional 
demographic information) were sampled from the Introduction to Psychology subject 
pool at DePaul University. A recruitment ad was posted on the SONA system and 
participants self-selected to participate in the study by signing up for the study on SONA. 
Participants were only able to participate in the study if they had access to a personal 







Demographic Characteristics of Participants in Pilot Study and Main Study 
Factor Total sample 
  Pilot Study                                            Full Study 
Gender     
 n 91 214  
 % female 92.31% 74.30%  
 % male 7.69% 24.77%  
Race     
 
% Asian or Asian-
American 10.99% 10.75%  
 
% Black or African-
American 3.30% 7.50%  
 % Hispanic or Latino/a 24.18% 21.03%  
 
% European American/non-
Hispanic White 52.74% 48.13%  
 % Mixed race 3.30% 7.48%  
  % Other 5.49% 5.14%   
 
The study employed a single-factor (Online content type: Instagram vs 
Wikipedia) between-participants design. In accordance with IRB requirements, all 
participants received information on the study procedure and provided informed consent 
prior to participating. Following the completion of all tasks, participants were debriefed 
and compensated accordingly. 
Materials 
Below are descriptions of each of the stimuli/measures used in the pilot study, but 
the Supplemental Materials documents provides a comprehensive outline of the 
experimental procedure. 
Online Content Type Manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to 
engage with one of two different types of online content: their personalized Instagram 




Instagram condition was intended to prime participants’ existing self-esteem 
contingencies and the Wikipedia condition served as a control group. 
Instagram Condition. Based on previous research findings that Instagram use 
mediates the relationship between contingent self-worth and self-esteem (Stapleton et al., 
2017), participants browsed their personal Instagram accounts for 10 minutes to prime 
existing self-esteem contingencies. For the first five minutes, participants looked at their 
personalized content feed where they can only view content from people that they follow. 
For the last 5 minutes, participants switched to viewing their “explore” feed, which has 
content that is curated for them based on the people that they follow and their 
algorithmically determined interests.  
Wikipedia Condition. As a control, participants in the Wikipedia condition 
browsed two sources of information about the history of the iPod: a pdf version of the 
Wikipedia page for the iPod and a pdf version of a blog article about the same topic. 
Exactly like the Instagram condition, participants spent five minutes reading the 
Wikipedia page and then they switched to the blog article for an additional five minutes. 
These documents are provided as supplemental materials to this proposal. Both versions 
of the document contained no social content and only provided factual information about 
the topic and thus should not have primed self-esteem contingencies. 
Manipulation Check. Following both conditions, participants had three minutes 
to respond to a free response question that asks them to recall as many specific details 
about the content that they saw. Participants also responded to a “select all that apply” 
question with categories that applied to the different kinds of content they engaged with. 




“music”, “memes”, “history”, and “other”. Responses of the “travel”, “family”, “memes”, 
or “other” category with reference to Instagram feed content were considered correct for 
participants in the Instagram condition and responses of “technology”, “music”, or 
“history” were considered correct for participants in the Wikipedia condition. 
Contingencies of Self-Worth Scale. The “others’ approval”, “appearance”, and 
“competition” subscales from Crocker et al.’s (2003) Contingencies of Self-Worth Scale 
(CSWS) were used to measure participants’ contingent self-esteem. The “others’ 
approval” subscale consists of five items in total with sample items such as “I don’t care 
what other people think of me” and “What others think of me has no effect on what I 
think about myself”. The “appearance” subscale consists of five items in total with 
sample items such as “My self-esteem does not depend on whether or not I feel 
attractive” and “My sense of self-worth suffers whenever I think I don’t look good” The 
“competition” subscale consists of five items in total with sample items such as “Doing 
better than others gives me a sense of self-respect” and “Knowing that I am better than 
others on a task raises my self-esteem”. Each item was measured on 7-point scales 
ranging from 1, Strongly disagree, to 7, Strongly agree. The full text of all scale items is 
available in the Appendix section.  
Contingent Self-Esteem Scale. Paradise and Kernis’ (1999) Contingent Self-
Esteem Scale (CSE) was used as an additional measure of participants CSE and was used 
to assess convergent validity of the manipulation. The scale is unidimensional and 
consists of 15 items with sample items such as “My overall feelings about myself are 
influenced by how much other people like and accept me”, “If I get along well with 




heavily influenced by what I believe other people are saying or thinking about me.” The 
full text of all scale items is available in the Appendix section. Each item was measured 
on 7-point scales ranging from 1, Strongly disagree, to 7, Strongly agree.  
Social Self-Esteem Scale. Lawson et al.’s (1979) unidimensional Social Self-
Esteem (SSE) Inventory was administered and scores were compared to participants’ 
responses on the previously discussed measures of CSE to assess discriminant validity. 
Being able to demonstrate the theoretical distinction between CSE and SSE with the 
proposed manipulation is very important because it would show that contingencies are 
being specially targeted, and participants’ resultant self-esteem is due to evaluations of 
the self in relation to others and not simply due to evaluations of the self in social 
contexts more globally. The Social Self-Esteem consists of 30 items with sample items 
such as “I find it hard to talk to strangers.”, “I lack confidence with people.”, “I am 
socially effective.”, “I feel confident in social situations.”, and “I get along well with 
other people.” The full text of all scale items is available in the Appendix section. All 
items were measured on 6-point scales ranging from 1, completely unlike me, to 6, 
completely like me. 
Fear of Negative Evaluation. The revised version of Leary’s (1983) Brief Fear 
of Negative Evaluation Scale (BFNE; Carleton et al., 2006) was used to measure 
participants’ fear of negative evaluation following the manipulation. Based on the 
relationship between CSE and FNE in the literature (Biolcati, 2017), scores on the CSWS 
(Crocker et al., 2003) were used to predict scores on the BFNE (Carleton et al., 2006) to 
assess the concurrent validity of the manipulation. The scale is unidimensional and 




think of me even when I know it doesn’t make any difference”, “It bothers me when 
people form an unfavorable impression of me”, and “I am frequently afraid of other 
people noticing my shortcomings”. The full text of all scale items is available in the 
Appendix section. All items were measured on 5-point scales, ranging from 1, not 
characteristic of me at all, to 5, completely characteristic of me.  
Procedure 
The pilot study was conducted in an online format using Qualtrics. Participants 
were randomly assigned to either the Instagram or Wikipedia condition and read that the 
study focuses on how engaging with online content influences memory and how memory 
is related to self-esteem. Depending on the condition to which they were randomly 
assigned, participants learned that they were to spend 10 minutes engaging with their own 
Instagram account or with a Wikipedia/blog article. In the Instagram condition, 
participants spent five minutes browsing their personalized Instagram feed and five 
minutes browsing their “explore” feed which contains curated content based on their 
algorithmically determined interests. In the Wikipedia condition, participants spent five 
minutes reading the Wikipedia page for the history of the iPod and five minutes reading a 
blog article about the same topic. In both conditions, a bell sound effect played after five 
and ten minutes to ensure that participants adhered to the timing instructions. After the 10 
minutes elapsed, participants were given three minutes to answer the free response 
memory questions, “What kind of content do you remember seeing?” and “Can you recall 




“select all that apply” manipulation check question with categories that applied to the 
types of content they engaged with.  
 After the manipulation check, participants responded, in order, to the 
Contingencies of Self-Worth Scale (Crocker et al., 2003), the Contingent Self-Esteem 
Scale (Paradise & Kernis, 1999), the Social Self-Esteem Inventory (Lawson et al., 1979), 
and the revised Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (Carleton et al., 2006). Finally, 
participants provided their age, gender, ethnicity, what they thought the study was about, 
and if they experienced any technical difficulties during the survey.  
Results 
Manipulation Check. Across the two conditions, participants engaged with their 
assigned online content type. Participants in the Instagram condition selected at least one 
of the appropriate categories with relatively high frequency (52.08% Travel; 60.42% 
Family; 72.92% Memes; 43.75% Other with reference to Instagram feed content like 
fashion/beauty (12.5%), food (8.33%), celebrities (6.25%), sports (2.1%), politics 
(2.1%)). There were similarly high relative frequencies of selecting at least one of the 
correct categories in the Wikipedia condition (100% Technology; Music 86.05%; History 
81.4%; 74.42% answered all three of Technology, Music, and History).  
 Evaluation of Psychometric Properties and Composite Scores. Confirmatory 
factor analyses were conducted using the ‘lavaan’ package (Rosseel, 2012) in RStudio to 
assess factor structure and psychometric properties of all scale measures. Results of the 






Goodness-of-Fit Summaries for Confirmatory Factor Analyses in Pilot Study 








1. Contingencies of Self-worth Scale  200.35* 87 0.837 0.12 0.121 
2. Contingent Self-Esteem Scale  310.49* 90 0.501 0.164 0.148 
3. Social Self-Esteem Scale  1201.49* 405 0.63 0.147 0.103 
4. Revised Brief Fear of Negative 
Evaluation Scale   103.28* 54 0.945 0.101 0.04 
Note. CFI = comparative fit index; RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation; 
SMSR = squared mean square residual. 
*p < .001 
The overall psychometric properties of the scales did not meet traditional 
threshold values to create composite scores with the original factor structures of the 
scales, although the CSWS (Crocker et al., 2003) and the revised BFNE (Carleton et al., 
2006) were more psychometrically sound than the CSES (Paradise & Kernis, 1999) and 
SSES (Lawson et al., 1979).  Composite scores were created for each of the scale 
measures by averaging participants’ responses to all items (after reverse-coding items 
where appropriate). Subscale structures were ignored due to unreliability of the subscales 
in the data. Reliability estimates for each of the full scales is reported in Table 3. For all 
scales, higher scores indicate more of the construct in question (e.g., higher CSWS scores 
correspond with more highly contingent self-esteem). 
Evidence for Validity of Measures. Table 3 shows the bivariate correlations 






Bivariate Correlations Between Global Composite Scores in Pilot Study 
Note. CSWS = Contingencies of Self-Worth Scale (Crocker et al., 2004); CSE = 
Contingent Self-Esteem Scale (Paradise & Kernis, 1999); SSE = Social Self-Esteem 
Scale (Lawson et al., 1979); BFNE = revised Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale 
(Carleton et al., 2006).  Values on the diagonal represent scale alphas. 
*p < .05 
**p < .001 
 
Convergent Validity. The correlation between participants’ composite scores on 
the CSWS (Crocker et al., 2003) and the CSES (Paradise & Kernis, 1999) was positive 
and strong (r = .84, p < .001). Participants with higher scores on the CSWS tended to 
have high scores on the CSES. The strong positive correlation between these two scales 
suggests that both scales are measuring contingent self-esteem and provide evidence for 
convergent validity. 
Discriminant Validity. The correlation between participants’ composite scores on 
the CSWS (Crocker et al., 2003) and the SSES (Lawson et al., 1979) was weakly 
negative (r = -.28, p = .02). Participants with more highly contingent self-esteem tended 
to have lower social self-esteem. However, the weak relationship between scores on these 
two scales indicates the discriminability of contingent self-esteem and social self-esteem 
as constructs. 
Concurrent Validity. Participants’ standardized composite scores on the revised 
BFNE (Carleton et al., 2006) were regressed on participants’ standardized composite 
scores on the CSWS (Crocker et al., 2003) using a simple regression analysis. CSWS 
  Average CSWS Average CSE Average SSE Average BFNE 
Average CSWS .85    
Average CSE 0.84** .81   
Average SSE -0.28* -0.28* .96  




scores significantly predicted scores on the revised BFNE (standardized β = .67, p < 
.001). More highly contingent self-esteem corresponded with greater fear of negative 
evaluation. These findings support the concurrent validity of the CSWS and the theorized 
relationship between contingent self-esteem and fear of negative evaluation. 
 Condition Differences in Contingent Self-Esteem. An independent samples t-
test was conducted to analyze differences in contingencies of self-worth scores between 
the Instagram and Wikipedia/News conditions. The difference between the Instagram (M 
= 4.40, SD = .862) and Wikipedia (M = 4.23, SD = .911) conditions was in the predicted 
direction but was not statistically significant; t(89) = .61, p = .55, d = .20). Additionally, 
exploratory independent samples t-tests were conducted for each of the individual items 
on the CSWS. No independent t-tests for differences between the individual items on the 
scale approached significance. 
Another independent samples t-test was conducted on participants’ Contingent 
Self-Esteem Scale scores between the two conditions. Participants in the Instagram 
condition did have slightly higher CSES scores (M = 4.75, SD = .73) than participants in 
the Wikipedia condition (M = 4.65, SD = .82), but the difference was not significant, 
t(89) = .90, p = .37, d = .13). Additional independent t-tests were computed for individual 
items on the CSE for exploratory purposes. Only the “My feelings of self-worth are 
basically unaffected when other people treat me badly” item yielded a significant 
difference, t(89) = 2.07, p = .04, d = .44. Participants in the Instagram condition indicated 
that their feelings of worth are more affected (M = 4.75, SD = 1.60) when people treat 




Independent samples t-tests were also carried out to examine condition 
differences in social self-esteem and fear of negative evaluation. Results of these t-tests 
showed no difference in social self-esteem (Instagram: M = 4.21, SD = 0.94; Wikipedia: 
M = 4.17, SD = 0.94; t(89) = .22, p = .82, d = .06) or fear of negative evaluation 
(Instagram: M = 3.42, SD = 0.98; Wikipedia: M = 3.18, SD = 1.13; t(88) = 1.07, p = .29, 
d = .23) by condition.  
Discussion 
The results of the pilot study provide evidence for the convergent, discriminant, 
and concurrent validity of the contingent self-esteem measures, but the results of the 
independent t-tests suggest that the experimental manipulation was not strong enough to 
elicit significant differences between conditions on self-report measures of contingent 
self-esteem. Taken together, these results suggest that engaging with Instagram 
(compared to Wikipedia) did not strongly prime self-esteem contingencies or strongly 
influence fear of negative evaluation. Despite these results, the similarity in social self-
esteem between conditions is encouraging because it supports the idea that the 
manipulation did not tap into social self-esteem instead of contingent self-esteem. 
However, this support for the manipulation should be interpreted cautiously given that 
the manipulation did not effectively produce differences for any of the constructs of 
interest and contingent self-esteem and social self-esteem were significantly, albeit 
weakly, correlated. Although the manipulation did not produce strong enough differences 
to be detected in the self-report measures, all but one of the items on the CSWS (Crocker 
et al., 2003) trended in the predicted direction. Sensitivity analyses indicated that a much 




differences at the α = .05 level with the current sample size. However, it is quite possible 
that participants easily identified the true purpose of the study and, as a result, responded 
in ways that could have unexpectedly influenced their scores. For instance, participants 
who were aware of the true purpose of the study may have responded in a way that either 
aligned with (i.e., reported higher contingent self-esteem) or opposed (i.e., reported lower 
contingent self-esteem) the intended effect of the manipulation.  
In participants’ responses to what they thought the study was about, 39 (81%) 
participants in the Instagram condition and 3 (7%) participants in the Wikipedia condition 
correctly described the purpose of the study with no reference to the memory cover 
story1. A more subtle outcome measure may be helpful to mask the true purpose of the 
experiment given the number of participants’ who were aware of the true purpose of the 
study. For this reason, incorporating items from the CSWS (Crocker et al., 2003) into a 
more discreet measure of self-preoccupation that is presented to participants as a 
“rumination questionnaire” may offer a better approach to measuring contingent self-
esteem following the manipulation. Additionally, the optimal method for evoking the 
self-evaluative implications of other people’s social media activity is unclear based on 
these data. Varying the feed that participants in the Instagram condition see first (personal 
feed vs. explore feed) may offer insight into this issue and could provide useful 
information for further development of the online content type manipulation. Taken 
 
1 Given the stark contrast in awareness of the true purpose of the study by condition, 
exploratory 2 (Online Content Type) × 2 (Awareness of Study Purpose: yes, no) 
ANOVAs were conducted to test whether awareness of the study purpose interacted with 
condition to influence any of the outcomes of interest. These analyses yielded no 
significant main effects or interactions, suggesting that awareness of the purpose of the 
study did not systematically influence participants’ responses to the scale measures as a 




together, these revisions to the study design may improve the efficacy of the 
manipulation in producing the previously expected results, despite the lack of evidence in 
the validation data for the effect of social media on contingent self-esteem 
Main Study 
Though the pilot study showed little evidence for the effect of social media use on 
contingent self-esteem, these data cannot speak to the relationship between contingent 
self-esteem, self-preoccupation, and confirmation bias as the latter two constructs were 
not measured. For this reason, the main study used the same online content type 
manipulation as the pilot study, but with a few key changes to provide a more complete 
test of the originally proposed theoretical model. Firstly, the feed that participants in the 
Instagram condition see first (personal feed vs. explore feed) was varied to assess 
whether either order of presentation is more effective at evoking contingent self-esteem. 
Additionally, the main study included a selective exposure task and added a measure of 
self-preoccupation to measure confirmation bias and self-preoccupation, respectively. 
Including these elements will provide a more complete test of the originally proposed 
theoretical model and serve to answer the questions central to this thesis. 
Method 
Participants 
The study employed a 3 (Online Content Type: Instagram personal feed first, 
Instagram explore feed first, Wikipedia) × 2 (Information Type Interest: Consistent vs 
Inconsistent), mixed design with information type interest as the within-participants 
factor. A meta-analysis (Hart et al., 2009) on selective exposure to information found an 




Assuming a correlation among repeated measures of 0.5 and that the interaction effect is 
smaller than the average effect in the meta-analysis but still small (d = 0.1) to medium (d 
= 0.3) in size, a total sample size of 250 would give 80% power to detect a small-to-
medium interaction effect (d = 0.2) with a type I error rate of α = 0.05.  
Participants were sampled from the Introduction to Psychology subject pool (N = 
214, Mage = 19.77 years, SD = 3.08, see Table 1 for additional demographic information) 
at DePaul University and compensated with course credit for their participation. Due to 
time and participant availability limitations, the target sample size indicated by the power 
analysis was not reached. Considering this information and depending on the size of the 
true effect, the sample that was recruited for this study may be considered underpowered 
to detect the theorized effects.  
All participants self-selected to participate in the study by signing up for the study 
on SONA. Participants were only able to participate in the study if they had access to a 
personal Instagram account for use in the study and were compensated with course credit 
for participating.  In accordance with IRB requirements, all participants received 
information on the study procedure and provide informed consent prior to participating. 






 Below are descriptions of each of the stimuli/measures used in the current study, 
but the Supplemental Materials document provides a comprehensive outline of the 
experimental procedure. 
Preliminary Decision Task. The selective exposure paradigm involved 
participants making a decision at two points in time: once before they have any 
supplementary information about the decision topic and then again after having received 
additional information about the decision topic. The first part of the decision-making task 
involved participants making a yes/no decision on the question “should the voting age be 
lowered to 16?” Sixty participants (28.03%) indicated that they believe the voting age 
should be lowered to sixteen whereas the remaining 154 participants (71.97%) indicated 
that they believed the voting age should remain at 18. Participants then wrote a few 
sentences explaining their decision and answered five rating scale questions about their 
decision (“How difficult / important / comfortable was the decision?” and “How at ease / 
pleased are you with the decision?”). These five questions were presented with 9-point 
bipolar rating scales from 1, very easy / not at all important / comfortable / at ease / 
pleased to 9, very difficult / important / uncomfortable / uneasy / displeased.  
Online Content Type Manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of the three online content type conditions and the procedure of the manipulation was the 
same as in the validation study except participants were given two additional minutes to 
browse the content (Instagram: one minute extra for each feed; Wikipedia: one minute 
extra for each article). The Instagram conditions were intended to prime participants with 




Participants also completed the same “select all that apply” manipulation check question 
from the validation study in each condition. 
Contingent Self-Esteem. Only the “others’ approval” subscale from the 
Contingencies of Self-Worth Scale (CSWS; Crocker et al., 2003) was used to measure 
participants’ contingent self-esteem as these items most accurately represent the part of 
the construct that is expected to be active on social media. Overall, the subscale 
demonstrated acceptable reliability in the full sample (α = .82) and in the confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFI = .946; RMSEA = .153; SRMR = 0.064)2 participants’ responses to 
the five questions were averaged to create a composite score on the subscale. 
Self-Focus vs Task Focus. Due to the lack of state measures of self-
preoccupation in the literature, 10 new items (five items per subscale) were created to 
evaluate participants’ focus on the self (α = .78) and their focus on the task (α = .91) 
following the online content type manipulation. Sample items for focus on the self are 
“During the task, I was thinking about myself” and “I found myself focusing more on 
“me” than on the task” and sample items for focus on the task are “I felt focused on the 
task” and “I felt that it was easy to keep my attention on the task”. The full text for all 
items is available in the Appendix section. All items were measured with 7-point rating 
scales ranging from 1, Strongly disagree, to 7, Strongly agree.  
Confirmation Bias and Post Information Search Decision. To measure 
confirmation bias, participants completed the second portion of the selective exposure 
decision-making task. Participants were told that they would receive 16 pieces of 
 
2The RMSEA value did not reach the conventional cutoff to be considered reliable 
(RMSEA < .06), but considering the other two metrics suggested good reliability, the 





information related to the decision that they made at the beginning of the study (“Should 
the voting age be lowered to 16?”). Before they were presented with the information, 
participants read a short statement telling them that the information they were about to 
receive were summaries of political scientists’ responses about whether the voting age 
should be lowered to 16 that were taken from a recent special edition Op-Ed of a political 
science journal. In reality, the statements were fabricated to suggest positive and negative 
information about either side of the argument. The full text of the 16 statements can be 
read in the Supplemental Materials document.  
Of the 16 statements, half argued for lowering the voting age to 16 and half 
argued against lowering the voting age. Within each set of 8 statements, half discussed 
advantages of the chosen alternative and half discussed disadvantages of the unchosen 
alternative. For example, a statement discussing the advantages of lowering the voting 
age to 16 was “Lowering the voting age to 16 would increase voter turnout” and a 
statement discussing the disadvantages of maintaining the voting age at 18 was “Since 
16-year-olds can be emancipated from their parents in many states they should also be 
able to vote.” (See Supplemental Materials for more examples.) Each summary statement 
was randomly presented on a separate survey page and participants answered whether 
they would like to read the full statement (if given the opportunity) and how relevant 
each piece of information was (even if they have indicated that they would not like to 
read the whole statement) on a 7-point scale ranging from 1, not at all relevant, to 7, very 
relevant.  
Following participants’ responses to all 16 statements, they answered whether 




rating scale questions that they were asked about their decision at the beginning of the 
study (“How difficult / important / comfortable was the decision?” and “How at ease / 
pleased are you with the decision?”). Confirmation bias scores were calculated by taking 
the mean value of consistent pieces of information chosen and inconsistent pieces of 
information chosen and taking the difference between these means for each participant 
(e.g., the confirmation bias score for a person selecting 5 consistent pieces and 3 
inconsistent pieces would be given by 5/8 – 3/8). Higher positive scores reflected a 
greater interest in information that was consistent with the participant’s choice and, 
therefore, more confirmation bias. 
Procedure 
This study took place online using the Qualtrics survey platform. Upon visiting 
the survey link, participants learned that the research was focused on how engaging with 
online content influences basic cognitive processes and emotions and that they would 
complete a two-part decision-making task and a memory task. The first part of the 
decision-making task involved participants making a yes/no decision on the question 
“should the voting age be lowered to 16?” Participants then wrote a few sentences 
explaining their decision and answered the five rating scale questions about their 
decision. Participants then read that they would receive some additional information 
about the decision topic, but it would take some time to prepare this information and, in 
the meantime, they were to complete a short memory task related to engaging with online 
content (either Instagram personal feed first, Instagram explore feed first, or Wikipedia, 




feelings. The procedure for this manipulation was the same as in the validation study, but 
with an added two minutes of engagement for each condition. 
Following the memory task, participants completed the “rumination 
questionnaire” which consisted of the 10 new self and task focus items and the “others’ 
approval” subscale from the CSWS (Crocker et al., 2003). After the memory task, 
participants read that they would now receive additional information about the decision 
they made at the beginning of the study. Participants were randomly presented with 16 
summary statements that they were led to believe came from a recent Op-Ed of a political 
science journal where political scientists wrote in about whether the voting age should be 
lowered to 16. In reality, the statements were constructed to suggest positive and negative 
information for either side of the argument. For each statement, participants selected 
whether they would like to read the full statement (if given the opportunity) and how 
relevant each piece of information was to their decision. After participants responded to 
all 16 statements, they stated whether they intended to stick with their initial decision and 
answered the same five rating scale questions they were asked about their decision at the 
beginning of the study.  Participants then provided their age, gender, race/ethnicity, 
frequency of social media use (approximate number of Instagram accounts they follow, 
number of Instagram followers they have, hours per week spent on Instagram, and 
approximate percentage of influencers that they follow), what they thought the study was 





Reliability Checks for Self-Focus and Task Focus. Separate exploratory factor 
analyses using Varimax rotation were carried out on the five self-focus and five task 
focus items (Table 4) and suggested that both sets of items loaded reliably (i.e., factor 
loadings greater than .3) onto their respective factors. The respective factors captured 
44.5% of the variance in self-focus scores and 67.4% of the variance in task focus scores. 
Based on these findings, separate composite scores were created for self-focus and task 
focus to be used in further analyses. 
Table 4 
Exploratory Factor Analyses for Self-Focus and Task Focus Items 
  Item           
       
  Self-Focus   Loading 
       
During the task, I was thinking about myself  .777 
I found myself focusing more on “me” than on the task .753 
I felt absorbed in thinking about myself   .637 
My focus on the task was interrupted by thoughts about myself .711 
I found myself comparing myself to others     .379 
       
  Task Focus    
       
I felt focused on the task    .869 
I felt engaged with the task    .756 
I felt distracted during the taska    .769 
I felt that it was easy to keep my attention on the task  .855 
I found it hard to concentrate on the taska     .849 
       





Manipulation Check. Across the three conditions, participants engaged with 
their assigned online content type. Participants in the two Instagram conditions selected 
at least one of the appropriate categories with relatively high frequency (33.78% Travel; 
37.16% Family; 68.92% Memes; 70.27% Other with reference to Instagram feed content 
like fashion/beauty (18.24%), food (7.43%), celebrities (4.73%), sports (9.46%), politics 
(10.81%)). There were similarly high relative frequencies of selecting at least one of the 
correct categories in the Wikipedia condition (90.9% Technology; Music 83.33%; 
History 78.79%; 65.15% answered all three of Technology, Music, and History).  
 Confirmation bias. There were three outcomes of interest for confirmation bias: 
participants’ mean scores for interest in reading consistent and inconsistent information 
in each of the conditions, ratings of relevance for consistent and inconsistent information, 
and their decision to stick with or change their preliminary decision.  
Information interest. A 3 (Online Content Type: Instagram explore feed first vs 
Instagram personal feed first vs. Wikipedia) × 2 (Information Type Interest: consistent vs 
inconsistent) mixed-factorial ANOVA with information type serving as the within-
participants factor was used to analyze participants’ interest in consistent and inconsistent 
information between conditions. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of information 
type. Overall, participants chose to read more consistent (M = .59, SD = .32) than 
inconsistent information (M = .53, SD = .34); F (1, 211) = 10.71, p = .001, d = 0.22. 
However, there was no main effect of online content type or Online Content Type × 
Information Type Interest interaction (Fs < 1.2). Figure 1 displays the means of 




Figure 1. Means of consistent and inconsistent information chosen by Online Content 
Type condition.  Overall, participants preferred to read more consistent than inconsistent 
information. 
Note. The only difference between the Instagram explore and personal conditions was the 
order of the feed that participants viewed first.  Instagram explore = explore feed first; 
Instagram personal = personal feed first. 
 
Information relevance. Another 3 (Online Content Type) × 2 (Information Type) 
mixed-factorial ANOVA with information type serving as the within-participants factors 
was used to analyze relevance ratings for consistent and inconsistent information by 
condition. Again, there was a main effect of information type. Participants rated 
consistent information (M = 5.12, SD = .85) as more relevant than inconsistent 
information (M = 4.43, SD = 1.13); F (1, 211) = 77.04, p < .001, d = 0.60. There was no 
main effect of condition or Condition x Information Type interaction (Fs < 1.4). Figure 2 

































Figure 2. Means ratings of information relevance for consistent and inconsistent 
information by condition.  Overall, participants rated consistent information as more 
relevant than inconsistent information. 
Note. The only difference between the Instagram explore and personal conditions was the 
order of the feed that participants viewed first.  Instagram explore = explore feed first; 
Instagram personal = personal feed first. 
 
Stay/change decisions. A two-way chi-square test of independence was 
conducted to analyze participants’ final stay/change decisions cross-tabulated against 
online content type. Results of this analysis suggested no difference in proportions of 
stay/change decision patterns between the three conditions (Instagram explore: 93.3% 
stay/6.67% change; Instagram personal: 94.52% stay/5.48% change; Wikipedia: 93.94% 






























 Self-Focus and Task Focus. Two additional one-way ANOVAs were conducted 
to evaluate whether any of the online content type conditions differed in self-focus or task 
focus. There were no condition differences in focus on the self during the task, F(2, 210) 
= 0.57, p = .57, with each condition reporting similar focus on the self (Instagram 
explore: M = 3.45, SD = 1.22; Instagram personal: M = 3.25, SD = 1.11; Wikipedia: M = 
3.39, SD = 1.32). The ANOVA for task focus did, however, reveal a significant 
difference between the conditions, F(2, 210) = 19.83, p < .001. A follow-up Tukey’s 
HSD post hoc test indicated that participants in the Wikipedia condition were 
significantly less focused on the task (M = 3.36, SD = 1.29) than participants in both the 
Instagram explore (M = 4.76, SD = 1.37, p < .001, d = 1.05) and the Instagram personal 




Contingent Self-Esteem and Self-preoccupation as Mediators. A serial 
mediation model was constructed where others’ approval scores and self-focus scores 
sequentially mediated the relationship between online content type and information 
interest difference scores. This analysis was conducted using the ‘Lavaan’ (Rosseel, 
2012) and ‘mediation’ packages (Tingley et al., 2014) in RStudio. All continuous 
predictors were mean centered and Monte Carlo estimation with 5000 repeated samples 
was used to produce estimates for the direct, indirect, and total effects of the model. 
Considering the lack of difference between the Instagram conditions, online content type 
was recoded to a binary dummy factor with the Wikipedia condition serving as the 
referent category and the combined Instagram conditions serving as the treatment group. 
The model showed no total effect of online content type on information interest scores (β 
= -.05, p = .18) and online content type did not predict either of the mediators [others’ 
approval (β = -.20, p = .30); self-focus (β = -.05, p = .79)]. Neither mediator predicted 
information interest scores [others’ approval (β = -.008, p = .59); self-focus (β = .003, p = 
.85)] and there was no direct effect of online content type on information interest score 
after accounting for the mediators (β = -.06, p = .18). Additionally, there was no indirect 
effect of either mediator on information interest scores [others’ approval (β = .001, p = 
.78); self-focus (β = .00004, p = .99)], nor a combined indirect effect of both mediators (β 
= .002, p = .893).  There was, however, a significant relationship between the two 
mediators – others’ approval significantly predicted self-focus (β = .24, p < .001). The 





Figure 3. Path model of theorized mediation effect.  The relationship between online 
content type (Instagram vs Wikipedia) and information interest was not sequentially 
mediated by self-esteem contingent on others’ approval and self-focus. Others’ approval 




Selective Exposure Task and Confirmation Bias. The analyses for both 
information interest and information relevance revealed significant main effects of 
information type such that information consistent with participants’ preliminary decisions 
(relative to inconsistent information) was selected more frequently and was rated as more 
relevant, overall. These findings indicate that the newly constructed selective exposure 
task with the decision about voting age was successful in replicating previous patterns of 
findings that have been produced with other selective exposure tasks (Frey, 1986; Hart et 
al., 2009). The information interest effect size (d = 0.22) was smaller than the average 
effect size found by Hart and colleagues’ (2009) meta-analysis (d = 0.36) but given the 




an online rather than lab context may account for this attenuation. In any case, this 
evidence supports the use of the current selective exposure paradigm in future research. 
 Online Content Type Manipulation. The current study did not find any 
differences between the online content type conditions on the others’ approval subscale 
of the Contingencies of Self-Worth Scale (CSWS; Crocker et al., 2003), the relevant 
confirmation bias outcomes, nor any condition by information type interactions. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that the online content type manipulation was not 
effective in eliciting differences in self-esteem contingent on others’ approval, which in 
turn makes it difficult to interpret the null findings on the confirmation bias outcomes. 
The lack of differences between conditions on the self-focus measure also supports the 
interpretation that the manipulation was ineffective at eliciting differences in contingent 
self-esteem or in attention placed on the self. It is clear from the manipulation check 
question responses that participants in the Instagram conditions engaged with a very wide 
variety of content. The inconsistency of participants’ experiences with their Instagram 
feeds likely contributed additional noise to the data, making it unclear what constructs 
were activated by the manipulation.  
 Further complicating the efficacy of the manipulation are the findings on task 
focus. The results showed that participants in the Wikipedia condition (relative to both 
Instagram conditions) were less focused on the memory task. This difference in 
engagement with the manipulation could have been influential to the results in a variety 
of ways, but additional analyses found no Online Content Type by Task Focus 




articles chosen3, which somewhat limits concern. Nonetheless, future attempts at 
investigating differences in contingent self-esteem when interacting with social or non-
social media should pay careful attention to potential differences in participants’ 
engagement with the experimental and control tasks. 
 A more effective manipulation may yet produce the predicted pattern of results, 
but it is apparent that further attempts would benefit from an approach that more 
specifically targets contingent self-esteem and self-preoccupation in the context of social 
media. For instance, participants’ interaction with the online content was passive in both 
the experimental and control conditions. It may be the case that contingent self-esteem 
and self-preoccupation require more active engagement with social media, such as 
posting or sharing content, to become activated. Future attempts at manipulating these 
constructs would likely benefit from adopting an approach that pays mind to active social 
media use, as differences between the experimental and control conditions would be 
more pronounced. For example, asking participants to take a photo of themselves and 
post it on their Instagram (versus taking a photo of themselves and saving it to their 
phone) would likely elicit a reaction in which the participant is concerned about their 
self-presentation and visibility to others. In addition to potential concern about increasing 
their visibility, participants may also be inclined to feel excitement or anxiety about 
others’ reception of the photo that they have just posted and begin to worry about what 
 
3 Separate moderated regression analyses were performed where information interest, 
information relevance, and total number of articles chosen were regressed on task focus 
(mean centered), online content type (reference = Wikipedia), and their interaction. None 
of these analyses yielded mean level differences on any of the outcomes by condition, nor 
any task focus by condition interactions, suggesting that task focus did not differentially 




others may think or say. In this example, it may be the case that active engagement on 
social media resembles the “spotlight effect,” – an egocentric bias where one 
overestimates the salience of their appearance and behavior to others (Gilovich et al., 
2000). This state of increased self-focused attention and anticipation of potential 
feedback about oneself could also be useful in eliciting the predicted patterns of 
confirmation bias theorized throughout this paper. As outlined in the introduction, 
heightened activation of contingent self-esteem and increased self-focused attention 
could bear cognitive costs that limit one’s ability to process information in an unbiased 
manner. For these reasons, future consideration should be given to experimental 
manipulations where participants actively interact with their social media in a way that 
increases their visibility to others, as these types of manipulations are likely to be more 




 Contingent Self-Esteem and Self-Preoccupation. Although there were no 
indirect or direct effects of either contingent self-esteem or self-preoccupation on 
information interest difference scores, increased contingent self-esteem was significantly 
related to increased self-focus following the manipulation. This finding is promising for 
future research, and a more effective manipulation may prime contingent self-esteem and 
in turn lead to differential focus on the self. Additionally, heightened self-focused 
attention has been shown to predict negative affect and rumination-based self-focus 
magnifies this effect (Mor & Winquist, 2002). Therefore, a manipulation that elicits self-
preoccupation, whether rumination based or not, may also be effective at producing 
negatively valanced emotional states, each with unique action tendencies that could be 
relevant to information processing. Furthermore, heightened negative affect does lead to 
selective attention toward negative information (Matthews & McLeod, 1994) and it may 
be the case that heightened negative affect influences other cognitive processes related to 
attention to and selection of information, such as those implicated in the current study. 
Though this remains to be determined, it is certainly an exciting direction for future 
investigation. 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
 The findings of the current study did not support the hypothesis that engaging 
with social media (compared to Wikipedia) primed existing self-esteem contingencies nor 
influenced confirmation bias behavior. However, we did find that more strongly basing 
one’s self-esteem on the approval of others predicted increased self-focus. And while 
self-focus did not influence confirmation bias in the current study, it is possible that 




(where heightened visibility to others and concerns about self-presentation are salient) 
will be effective at eliciting differences in confirmation bias as a product of differential 
focus on the self. Given the connection between contingent self-esteem and self-focus, 
manipulations that are effective at priming self-esteem contingencies will likely also be 
effective at heightening self-focused attention. However, the current study only measured 
the others’ approval domain of contingent self-esteem and therefore it is yet to be 
determined whether holding self-esteem contingencies in other domains (e.g., 
appearance, competition, competency) is related to heightened self-focused attention. 
Future research may benefit from understanding how self-esteem contingencies in other 
domains of self-worth are related to self-focused attention in specific social media 
contexts, as there is likely to be great variability in the self-esteem contingencies of social 
media users and the motivational goals that they pursue. For instance, it is likely that 
deriving self-esteem from one’s appearance (but not from one’s competency) would be 
influential to self-focus when posting a picture of oneself online. There may be similar 
patterns of self-focus across each domain of contingency, but the stimuli that are likely to 
elicit these patterns require further investigation. 
 Another interesting avenue for future research could be to explore the other end of 
the preoccupation spectrum: individuals who are strongly motivated by inclusive goals 
that involve both the self and others (see Crocker & Park, 2004, Shifting Goals section). 
By shifting one’s motivation from a subordinate goal (e.g., sharing a post to obtain 
“likes” from followers) to a superordinate goal (e.g., sharing a post to inform others about 
a topic), the focus is shifted away from validating self-worth and toward a more stable 




superordinate goals to be less likely to engage in confirmation bias behavior as their 
motivation is focused away from the self. In turn, this could offer an interesting contrast 
in future experiments where participants are explicitly asked to adopt either the 
motivational goal to validate self-worth or a goal that is more inclusive of others. 
Demonstrating that superordinate goals facilitate openness to information whereas self-
worth validation goals facilitate self-centered information processing would contribute 
evidence for the central argument of this thesis—that an overly self-focused individual is 
likely to selectively prefer information that supports their pre-existing beliefs and 
attitudes. Considering that people are naturally oriented to focus on the self, disinhibiting 
self-preoccupation by encouraging one to focus on superordinate goals may be a strategy 
that is just as effective at revealing the behaviors that are associated with a baseline or 
elevated state of self-focused attention. In other words, understanding one’s behavior 
when focus on the self is low is just as informative as examining situations where focus 
on the self is high because it allows for comparisons of cognitive, emotional, and 
behavioral processes when the self is not the center of attention. Future research should 
pay careful attention to the factors that underlie effective superordinate goals as these 
elements are likely to be the most helpful with respect to reorienting the focus of 
individuals who are overly self-focused toward a more robust method of pursuing self-
esteem. 
 Throughout this thesis, the focus has been placed more heavily on the possible 
cognitive and motivational consequents of self-esteem contingencies and social media 
use. However, self-esteem contingencies and social media do not only affect our 




Though beyond the scope of this paper, unpacking the cognitive, emotional, and 
behavioral consequents of self-esteem contingencies and self-focused attention on social 
media is absolutely a worthwhile pursuit. By understanding the psychological constructs 
that are activated by engagement with social media content and the psychological 
processes that result from the activation of these constructs, we will be better equipped to 
combat negative outcomes related to social media use. Whether we like it or not, social 
media are poised to become increasingly more interweaved into our lives; keeping up 
with the resulting cognitive, social, and emotional phenomena that are likely to follow, 
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Appendix A: Measures 
Contingencies of Self-Worth Scale (Crocker et al., 2003) 
 
Others’ Approval 
I don’t care what other people think of me 
What others think of me has no effect on what I think about myself 
I don’t care if other people have a negative opinion about me 
My self-esteem depends on the opinions others hold of me 
I can’t respect myself if others don’t respect me 
Appearance 
My self-esteem does not depend on whether or not I feel attractive 
My self-esteem is influenced by how attractive I think my face or facial features are 
My sense of self-worth suffers whenever I think I don’t look good 
My self-esteem is unrelated to how I feel about the way my body looks 
When I think I look attractive, I feel good about myself 
Competition 
Doing better than others gives me a sense of self-respect” 
Knowing that I am better than others on a task raises my self-esteem 
My self-worth is affected by how well I do when I am competing with others 
My self-worth is influenced by how well I do on competitive tasks 
I feel worthwhile when I perform better than others on a task or skill 
 







Contingent Self-Esteem Scale (Paradise & Kernis, 1999) 
 
My overall feelings about myself are influenced by how much other people like and 
accept me 
If I get along well with somebody, I feel better about myself overall  
An important measure of my worth is how physically attractive I am 
My overall feelings about myself are heavily influenced by what I believe other people 
are saying or thinking about me 
If I am told that I look good, I feel better about myself in general 
An important measure of my worth is how well I perform up to the standards that other 
people have set for me 
Even on a day when I don’t look my best, my feelings of self-worth remain unaffected 
My overall feelings about myself are heavily influenced by how good I look 
An important measure of my worth is how competently I perform 
Even in the face of failure, my feelings of self-worth remain unaffected 
A big determinant of how much I like myself is how well I perform up to the standards 
that I have set for myself 
My feelings of self-worth are basically unaffected when other people treat me badly 
If I know that someone likes me, I do not let it affect how I feel about myself 
When my actions do not live up to my expectations, it makes me feel dissatisfied with 
myself 
Even in the face of rejection, my feelings of self-worth remain unaffected 
 







Social Self-Esteem Inventory (Lawson et al., 1979) 
 
I find it hard to talk to strangers. 
I lack confidence with people. 
I am socially effective. 
I feel confident in social situations. 
I am easy to like. 
I get along well with other people. 
I make friends easily. 
I am lively and witty in social situations. 
When I am with other people I lose self-confidence. 
I find it difficult to make friends. 
I am no good at all from a social standpoint. 
I am a reasonably good conversationalist. 
I am popular with people my own age. 
I am afraid of large parties. 
I truly enjoy myself at social functions. 
I usually say the wrong thing when I talk with people. 
I am confident at parties. 
I am usually unable to think of anything interesting to say to people. 
I am a bore with most people. 
People do not find me interesting. 
I am nervous with people who are not close friends. 
I am quite good at making people feel at ease with me. 
I am more shy than most people. 
I am a friendly person. 
I can hold people’s interest easily. 
I don’t have much “personality”. 
I am a lot of fun to be with. 
I am quite content with myself as a person. 
I am quite awkward in social situations. 
I do not feel at ease with other people. 
 








Revised Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (Carleton et al., 2006) 
 
I worry about what other people will think of me even when I know it doesn’t make any 
difference. 
It bothers me when people form an unfavorable impression of me. 
I am frequently afraid of other people noticing my shortcomings. 
I worry about what kind of impression I make on people. 
I am afraid that others will not approve of me. 
I am afraid that people will find fault with me. 
I am concerned about other people’s opinions about me. 
When I am talking with someone, I worry about what they may be thinking about me. 
I am usually worried about what kind of impression I make. 
If I know someone is judging me, it tends to bother me. 
Sometimes I think I am too concerned with what other people think of me. 
I often worry that I will say or do the wrong things. 
 
Responses made on 5-point rating scale (1 = completely uncharacteristic of me, 5 = 






Self-Focus vs Task Focus 
 
Self-focus 
During the task, I was thinking about myself 
I found myself focusing more on “me” than on the task 
I felt absorbed in thinking about myself 
My focus on the task was interrupted by thoughts about myself 
I found myself comparing myself to others 
 
Task focus 
I felt focused on the task 
I felt engaged with the task 
I felt distracted during the task 
I felt that it was easy to keep my attention on the task 
I found it hard to concentrate on the task 
 
Responses made on 7-point rating scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree) 
 
 
 
